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Philosophers' Carnival #61...

...is here.

Philosophers' Carnival #60...

...is here.

From the current carnival's host, at the end of the carnival post:

To all the contributors who made the cut, especially those who stuck to the theme, well done and keep up the good work. The Editors appreciate the effort that you went to.

With only one exception (the article was good, but not actual philosophy), the rest of the submissions we received were essentially political, commercial or religious spam and/or total and utter drivel. Those people will get nothing from us except pure contempt. You know who you are.

Emphasis added.  Wrt the emphasized bits (I have no problem with contempt for spam and the like): This comes across as pure contempt for submissions that the host(s) considers 'total and utter drivel'.  Perhaps the host is aiming for humor here; I hope it's a misguided attempt at humor.  Some thoughts:

Maybe I'm humorless (although I am very silly, that's not the same as having a sense of humor), but I really don't get the appeal of or the reason for this sort of response.  And it's not just this particular response.  There's plenty of snark out there so please understand me to be talking about the widespread use of snark, belittlement, insult, etc.  See Leiter for related recent discussions of tone and civility wrt book reviews.

Let's say that the submissions considered 'total and utter drivel' were submitted by their authors as good faith efforts at philosophy.  The host, as is their right, accepted some submissions and declined others.  Submissions were rejected for the various reasons mentioned.

But why include at all the second paragraph quoted above?  Spammers will not be surprised that their submissions didn't get through and their reaction is irrelevant.  The good faith submitters can figure out that if their submission wasn't included in the carnival, it was rejected.  They don't need to hear that the host considers their submission 'total and utter drivel' and worthy of 'pure contempt'.

In response to anyone who thinks, 'But their submissions were really, really bad!": What does a snarky comment achieve? 

• It informs the author that someone thinks their work stinks.  Is this the best way to tell someone that their work does not meet another's standards?  Will it enlighten the author or anyone else?  Will it assist the author to become a better philosopher?  Is any evaluator in such an undisputed position that such rudeness is acceptable?  Is any person, evaluator or otherwise, in such a position?  (Please note that it's not as though I never condone rudeness.  E.g., 'no means no' + whatever the person needs to do to avoid harm = fine by me no matter what.)
• Perhaps it feels good to say stuff like this.  Okay, I grant (and admit) that it can feel good to be snarky, to act superior, etc., yet I don't recommend it.  It rarely improves the speaker or the listener.
• It's easier and quicker.  Again, I grant that it's easier and faster to reject someone's work as opposed to engage them in any improving manner.  I don't suggest that it's the evaluator's responsibility to engage a submitter in an improving manner, but it's certainly not their responsibility to humiliate them.
• Wrt public snark: As some folks commented in the Leiter posts, public snark detracts from the evaluation.  As someone who was unaware of alleged animus between McGinn and Honderich, I did wonder if there was something non-professional going on when I read excerpts of the former's review of the latter's book.  (I have not read any other reviews between these two individuals, in either direction.)  It suggests that one wishes to criticize at least the person and possibly the work.  I'm uninterested in that.
• Who else (besides the host/evaluator/reviewer) cares that the host(s)/evaluator(s)/reviewer(s) thinks someone's work is 'total and utter drivel' and worthy of 'pure contempt'?  It adds nothing to my knowledge and consideration of the work and, as noted above, suggests a personal angle to the negative criticism.  By personal, it need not be so personal that the people know each other, only that the evaluator gets some personal benefit out of it.

Maybe it's not that I'm humorless, or perhaps not just humorless, but that I'm old, too.  I estimate I'm about 10-15 years ahead of the rise of snark.  I'm not as accustomed to it, have not become enamored of it and remain unimpressed by it.  Okay, yes, it can be funny.  Teasing snark between friends is funny, but perhaps then it's not really snark.  Standup comedians sometimes do funny snark.  I don't see the funny in public humiliation snark.

Sometimes I wonder if those who insist that one really must be rude in order to make some professional point are really interested in their profession or if they simply wish to reserve the right to be rude.  Perhaps such insistence comes later, to justify past rudeness.

I imagine many people reading this have no interest in rudeness or civility.  That's a shame.  Civility and etiquette are not just about saying the right things, using the right fork, deferring to certain people in certain situations, etc, i.e., what many would consider useless behaviors.  It's really quite functional in that it helps to keep interpersonal interactions moving smoothly.  I also consider it a selfish endeavor bc it so often (though not always) serves to ensure that one is able to do exactly as they wish.  Personally, I find it makes day to day life a little more pleasurable.

Disclaimer: I have never submitted anything to the Philosophers' Carnival.

Updated to add:   Readers should not take away the idea that I consider myself an excellent practitioner of what I preach.  I am not.  In fact, I handled a recent IRL experience in spectactularly bad fashion.  I am perfectly capable of screwing up handily wrt civility, however, I don't generally recommend it for myself or others.

Philosophers' Carnival #59...

...is here.

Estimation

The 58th Philosophers' Carnival at Philosophy Sucks! includes a link to What's the deal with philosophy of religion? at The Incredible Hallq.  I posted previously about 'The Reception of Philosophy of Religion' post at Prosblogion.  Both external posts deal with the how por is viewed within philosophy in general.  Both conclude, rather tentatively bc neither claims to be based on serious inquiry (and I don't imagine there's data out there on this), that por is viewed poorly.

This brings to mind something about which I've been thinking lately.  Rather than thinking about how to view the entire field of por, how to view those with whom I disagree about religious matters?  Surely there's overlap, but there's more underlap (?) than overlap bc most of the people with whom I disagree about religious matters are not philosophers (the ones who are philosophers are, I should think, used to reasonable disagreement, criticism, questions, etc.).  They're, like, the majority of living people; people I deal with everyday; people I call friends and family.  Seeing as I like and think well of the vast majority of people within my circle (believers and non-believers), I don't really wish to be sniggering* at any of these people.  Of course, should someone provide reason for me to think poorly of them, then I'll think poorly of them, at least wrt the area of the provided reason.  And yes, I admit that if, more generally speaking, I don't care for them, I will most likely snigger at them.  Small, yes, but there it is.

So.  What to think, what to think, what to think?  Disclosure: As usual, I am thinking out loud here.  This question has been floating around in my head for some time now without me making much progress toward answering it.  It remains rather disorganized in my head bc I find there are many, seemingly disconnected things to consider.  I'm afraid this calls for a brain dump.  Things to consider:

Believers believe in different ways and degrees.  There's the person who believes bc that's (a) how they were raised and (b) what they were taught and (c) haven't thought through their beliefs.  At the other end of the spectrum, there's the person who believes precisely bc they've thought through (a) their beliefs and (b) why they hold them.  And then there's all the folks in between.

Believers are more than their beliefs.  Perhaps this should be obvious.  An atheist teen recently remarked how they (and I paraphrase here) 'just laugh at Christians' and 'make fun of Christians' bc 'they're so stupid'.  I cringed inside upon hearing this (no doubt bc I recognized a younger, embarrassing version of myself; not necessarily a younger self that ridiculed Christians, but probably ridiculed people bco one thing about them; but also) bc I thought of the believers with whom I share other beliefs, values, interests, etc.  They run the intellectual gamut, although I wouldn't call any of them 'stupid'.  That's pretty harsh.  They also run the gamuts of kindness, consideration, conversationality (word?), creativity, enthusiasm, activity, etc.  No reason to whale on a person just bco their religious beliefs, unless...

...some believers expect others to at least act in accordance with their beliefs, even if others don't actually share their beliefs.  This is where politics and the alleged role of religion in public life comes in.  I greatly appreciate a nice, healthy, sturdy separation between church and state.  The establishment clause is one of the best ideas evar.  The foisting of one's religious beliefs on others, whether personally and individually or publically via legislation, really puts a hive of bees in my bonnet.  But then I think...

...is it correct to think that government is of the people, by the people, for the people except when it comes to anything to do with said people's religion?  I.e., why shouldn't believers vote their beliefs?  When I vote in alignment with my atheist beliefs, am I not voting my non-belief?  Why not accord believers that same opportunity?  I have a sneaking suspicion that there's a very good legal, constitutional reason for thinking of the two scenarios quite differently.  Perhaps it's that voting my non-belief into legislation (a) is in accordance with the Establishment Clause and (b) does not preclude anyone from practicing their religion.  Whereas, voting one's belief into legislation (a) is not in accordance with the Establishment Clause; (b) forces the majority religion's beliefs into the public sphere to the detriment of atheists and non-majority religions; and (c) precludes the believers of non-majority religions to practice their religion as freely as the majority religion.  Considering that I'm totally talking out my hat here, I'll just drop this consideration for now and leave it to the legal, constitutional experts.

Believers and non-believers are not static in their belief/non-belief.  Like most people, I was raised within a religion (Roman Catholic).  As I've gone through life, my thoughts and beliefs about religion have morphed.  Occasionally, I've been more of a believer.  Now I'm an atheist.  For most of my life, I've been a questioner of religion.  Believers may go through ups and downs in the depth and degree of their belief.  E.g., parenthood and the option to baptize, christen, I forget the name of the Jewish ceremony, plus whatever other religions do to bring infants into the fold, often get parents thinking about their religion, especially if more than one religion is involved or even if no religion is involved.

Most believers are raised as believers and it's a hard habit to break, if one is so inclined.  Think about all the stuff your parents/caregivers told you and you just accepted like delicious candy or at least like your daily Flintstones vitamin.  This indoctrination (of valuable and valueless ideas) starts from Day One and, even if you intellectually put aside what was told to you, it's often emotionally and/or psychologically still there.  (I sometimes think it's especially still there in the case of Roman Catholics bco the guilt factor, but perhaps that's just the latent martyr in me.)

Judge not lest ye be judged.  Hey, there are a lot of good ideas that are religious in origin!  Or, if not strictly in origin, are strongly affiliated with religion. Who am I to judge another solely bco their religious beliefs?  Okay, I claim the right to do so when they start to trample on my or others' beliefs/non-beliefs/rights.  Especially in light of some level of religious indoctrination most people receive as part of their upbringing, most people can't help but have some kind of religious beliefs.  Religion is just one piece of luggage, among beliefs about character, education, health, nutrition, recreation, work, etc., on the baggage carousel of life that parents bequeath their children.  Sometimes the kids take their own bags, sometimes they take someone else's bag, sometimes they leave the bag to the lost & found. 

Okay, I'm off bc, no matter how many things one can think about, one still has to get one's hair cut.

*I say 'sniggering' in recognition of  Hallq's sense that there are at least some atheist philosophers who snigger behind theistic philosophers of (among other things) religion, rather than go further to publish/state their reasons for disagreeing with those philosophers.

Philosophers' Carnival #58...

...is here at Philosophy Sucks!

KA Again

Back to the knowledge argument (KA; prior post here).  As in that post, I continue to hash stuff out right here, right now.  A commenter at that post and a commenter on this post (which was part of Philosophers' Carnival #55 at The Brooks Blog) at Evanescent pointed me toward some helpful stuff.    The Evanescent post includes this Dennett quote (about halfway through the post) wrt KA:

The philosopher Daniel Dennett however “argues that Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red. Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew “everything about color”, that knowledge would include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the “quale” of color. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that the misleading aspect of the story is that Mary is supposed to not merely be knowledgeable about color but to actually know all the physical facts about it, which would be a knowledge so deep that it exceeds what can be imagined, and twists our intuitions.”

That's the kind of stuff I was looking for.  For reference, here's KA:

1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people.
2. Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other people (because she learns something about them on her release).
3. Therefore, there are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story.

From the first reading of it, something struck me as kind of odd about KA.  It seemed like it proved an awful lot, which is certainly something to write home about, yet it did so too easily.  As I mentioned before, what's to keep the physicalist from arguing (I'll call this 'PA'):

1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people. (same as #1 above)
2. ' Mary (before her release) knows everything there is to know about other people (bc she does not learn anything about them upon her release)
3. ' Therefore, all truths about other people (and herself) are part of the physicalist story.

But PA doesn't seem as plausible and intriguing as KA.  Why is that?  PA has the same structure, the same #1, relies on a similar intuition in #2, but I don't expect it would be as attractive (i.e., seeming immediately plausible) as KA.  A large part of KA's plausibility probably comes from the idea that, in this thought experiment, yes, it would seem like Mary learns something on her release.  As I said, something didn't sit right with me wrt KA, yet I still felt (and continue to feel) the pull of its second premise.   Obvs, I'm not alone (also obvs, I'm late to the party): there's a vast literature about KA and much of that is focussed on premise 2.

I wonder if there isn't more to think about wrt KA's #1.  I don't have it at hand, but I think Jackson argues somewhere that it's not about imagination.  Yet if you imagine physicalism to have a certain amount of explanatory power one way, you might argue KA; the other way and you might argue PA.  Or, as in the Dennett quote above, complete physical knowledge might be (at this point) beyond our imaginative ability; our ignorance may well be limiting our knowledge, yet definitely influencing our intuitions.  This is part of why I think:

• KA allegedly proves too much
• KA assumes rather than proves its conclusion

What about the argument as a whole?  Yer basic Christian might think something along the lines of:

• There's a world.
• I'm part of this world.
• I wonder where it came from?
• I know I didn't make the world.
• It would take something pretty powerful to make a world.
• There must be something pretty powerful that made the world.

Please note that I stress the 'might think' bc I realize that not all Christians (or other individuals of an identifiable group) think the same way.  By this particular thought pattern, I mean to suggest the 'All I have to do is look around me to know that God exists' belief, which is, I think, not uncommon.

If you prefer, think about the (IMHO, all too quick) tendency of some to identify certain currently inexplicable events as miracles, including (my favorite), the medical miracle.

• The doctors said she'd never get pregnant and now she's a mother of six.
• The doctors don't know why the cancer went away, but it did.  It's a miracle.
• Our 17th IVF attempt took on the day my mother died; she was our guardian angel that made it happen.

Most people who make these kinds of claims surely don't think them all the way through in a rigorous manner; it's likely not a priority for them.  If I wanted to challenge such a speaker, I'd want to know how they got from 'unusual thing X happened' to 'it's a miracle'.  In the case of an alleged miracle, I'd expect a huge chain of reasoning.  I apply these thoughts about the structure of the miracle claims apply to the KA itself.

Hold that thought.  Time to go.

Philosophers' Carnival #55...

...is here.

Philosophers' Carnival #52...

...is here.

The Knowledge Argument

You know, there are a few things I just don't get about the knowledge argument (KA).  I've been staring at it and staring at it and still not getting anywhere.  So I'm going to hash out some things here and see if anything floats to the top.

Here's the version of KA that I'm using:

1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people.
2. Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other people (because she learns something about them on her release).
3. Therefore, there are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story.

It's from D. Rosenthal's The Nature of Mind.  As per Jackson, this version is a 'convenient and accurate way of displaying the argument', a version he offered in response to one of Churchland's objections to KA.  If he thinks it's convenient and accurate, then that's good enough for me.

Now, there's always been something about KA that's bothered me and I'm just now getting around to trying to put my finger on the offending tidbit.  Basically, it has something to do with assuming, rather than proving, its conclusion.  I haven't thought this all the way through yet, i.e., I really am hashing it out here, but here are some things that contribute to this idea about assuming the conclusion.

But first:  while reading up on KA, I came across something that was along the lines of what I'm thinking here.  I seem to recall that it was an online source, although I can't be sure about it.  I've revisited the SEP version linked above and have not found the missing link there, though I may have overlooked it.  If anyone knows what the hell I'm talking about, please clue me in.  I would very much like to find that item.

My bottom line thought:  What's to keep the physicalist from arguing the following (those are prime marks at the beginning of statements to differentiate them from the original argument above):

1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people. (same as #1 above)
2. ' Mary (before her release) knows everything there is to know about other people (bc she does not learn anything about them upon her release)
3. ' Therefore, all truths about other people (and herself) are part of the physicalist story.

KA posits complete physical knowledge in 1.  We do not currently have complete physical knowledge, but no biggie.  Maybe this is set in the future when we do have complete physical knowledge.  We don't now know what exactly is included in this future complete physical knowledge.  We do know that if there's physical knowledge out there to be known, we know it.

So, my basic problem with #1 is, if we don't know what comprises this complete physical knowledge we're positing,  how can we then say in #2 that some bit of knowledge is not part of complete physical knowledge?  Perhaps it's bc when we think about Mary upon her release, we're thinking about her ito current incomplete physical knowledge, which cannot account for what Mary learns, even though we're supposed to be thinking about her ito future complete physical knowledge.

Of course, we could say this about the modified argument above.  If we don't know what comprises this complete physical knowledge we're positing, how can we then say in#2' that some bit of knowledge is part of complete physical knowledge?  In this case, perhaps it's bc when we think about Mary upon her release, we're thinking about her ito future complete physical knowledge, which we might like to be able to account for what Mary supposedly learns, but we don't really know how to think about future complete physical knowledge.

And this, my friends, will be it for now bc it's time to go.

Philosophers' Carnival #51...

...is here at Enigmania.